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This paper studies the relationship between product diversification and financial performance in U.S. health 
insurers during 2005 – 2014. We focus on diversification among different types of comprehensive coverage – 
termed related diversification. We use a modified Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as a proxy for product 
diversification and measure financial performance by both return on assets and return on capital. We find a 
robust positive relationship between product diversification and performance. Moreover, the positive relationship 
still holds when the performance measures are adjusted for volatility. These findings support the theoretical 
foundation of economies of scope and risk-reduction, as adapted to the U.S. health insurance industry. We also 
develop two empirical proxies for the underwriting and asset investment risk taking of health insurers. For health 
insurers, the relationship between performance and risk-taking in product and asset management is similar to 
other types of insurers. A noteworthy finding is that the positive relationship between product diversification and 
performance is stronger during the financial crisis years than in the recent healthcare reform era. This suggests 
that diversification as a risk reduction strategy may be less effective when reform changes the healthcare 
environment.     
 
 




 In recent years, U.S. health insurers have experienced continual macro environment changes. The financial 
crisis of 2008 – 2009 challenged health insurers’ asset portfolio management and increased uncertainties on 
investment returns. Following the financial market turmoil, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 generated 
additional challenges. With major provisions implemented in 2010 – 2014, the ACA has significantly affected the 
operations of health insurers generally and their comprehensive lines in particular.1 Health insurance products with 
comprehensive coverage include Individual and Group Comprehensive insurance, Federal Employees Health 
Benefit Plans (FEHBPs), Medicare Advantage plans, and Medicaid managed care plans. In response to various ACA 
requirements, such as the health insurance mandate, health insurance exchanges, Medicaid expansion, and the small 
business group insurance requirement, health insurers have been expanding comprehensive coverage product lines. 
They have also experienced enrollment shifts among existing comprehensive coverage products. All these changes 
have affected the product diversification of health insurers (see Table 1). It is reasonable to inquire if changes in 
product diversification affect the financial performance of health insurers. The relationship between product 
diversification and firm performance has been studied extensively in economics and finance literature but relatively 
little in the health insurance industry.  
 Our study examines this relationship for U.S. health insurers in the period 2005 – 2014. We have a number 
of interesting findings. We find that product diversification in insurance plans with comprehensive coverage is 
positively related to health insurers’ performance during 2005 – 2014. In addition, the positive relationship holds 
when performance is adjusted for volatility. In other words, product diversification improves insurers’ performance 
without adding to the risk. Another insightful observation is that the positive relationship is stronger during the 
financial crisis years (2005 – 2009) than the ACA reform years (2010 – 2014). The positive impact of product 
diversification on performance and risk-reduction becomes less obvious when each product is affected by the ACA 
                                               
1 Health Reform Implementation Timeline, the Henry J. Kaiser Foundation, http://kff.org/interactive/implementation-timeline/ 
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provisions. In addition to these major findings, we see consistent results for the control variables commonly used in 
other sectors.   
 
 To put our study of product diversification and performance for U.S. health insurers into context, we 
review the literature in finance, economics, and insurance industries. The literature has developed various theoretical 
foundations such as economies of scope, risk-reduction, and agency theory to interpret sometimes contradictory 
relationships empirically observed in different sectors. To our knowledge, no previous studies have addressed this 
topic for U.S. health insurers. In this paper, we adapt existing theories to an industry with unique business operation 
– U.S. health insurers, who serve as both healthcare services managers and financial intermediaries between 
healthcare providers and patients. Economies of scope suggest that comprehensive product diversification is 
positively related to health insurer performance. Risk-reduction theory suggests that comprehensive product 
diversification is positively related to risk-adjusted performance.   
  
 In our empirical study, a modified Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is used to measure the level of 
product diversification. Taking into account the nature of U.S. health insurers’ business, we develop new measures 
for their asset investment and underwriting risk taking. Since health insurers need high liquidity for paying claims, 
we propose as asset risks measure the proportionate value of the asset portfolio that is invested in low liquidity and 
low quality investments. As to underwriting risk, we observe empirically that Medicaid managed care plans exhibit 
the greatest volatility of underwriting performance during 2005-2014. We propose as product risk the ratio of 
Medicaid covered members to total members in all comprehensive plans of the insurer. The data are extracted from 
health insurers’ annual financial statements filed with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
(NAIC). Fixed effect panel regression adjusted for the endogeneity of product diversification is run to estimate the 
empirical model.  
 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II is an introduction to U.S. health insurers’ business 
operation; Section III reviews relevant literature and develops major hypotheses; Section IV discusses the model, 
variables, and statistical methods; Section V presents empirical results; and Section VI concludes the paper.  
 
 
U.S. HEALTH INSURANCE INDUSTRY BUSINESS OPERATIONS 
 
 As insurance companies, health insurers are similar to life/health and property-liability insurers in that they 
underwrite insurance policies and manage asset portfolios. Health insurers collect premiums by underwriting health 
insurance policies and pay for claims to healthcare providers when medical services are delivered to insureds. For 
insurers to be profitable, premiums collected need to surpass the amount of claims plus the underwriting cost. In 
addition to underwriting health insurance policies, health insurers manage investment portfolios that serve as sources 
of funds to pay claims and that generate investment income. More than most other types of insurers, health insurers 
need liquidity in their asset portfolios because medical claims need to be reimbursed on a fast and frequent basis. 
Therefore, the majority of their asset portfolios is invested in high quality and liquid asset classes such as short-term 
money market securities, government bonds and high grade corporate bonds.   
 
 Most importantly, health insurers manage the delivery of healthcare services to insureds through their 
provider networks, a process called ‘managed care’. Managed care both extends and limits services. On the one 
hand, a health insurer builds up its provider network by contracting with a number of healthcare providers and 
signing ‘managed care contracts’. These contracts specify extensive services to be delivered. Major terms usually 
include healthcare service type, quantity, reimbursement rate and method. The goal of the managed care contract is 
to align healthcare providers’ and insurers’ interests in terms of cost containment and healthcare quality 
improvement. On the other hand, insurers control policyholders’ healthcare service utilization by managed care 
techniques such as gatekeepers, pre-authorization, copays, and deductibles. Insurers’ varying managed care skills 
affect medical claim costs.         
 
 Health insurers underwrite various health insurance products with respect to coverage, insured population, 
and payer. Major types of products include Individual/Group Comprehensive, Federal Employee Health Benefit 
Plans (FEHBPs), Medicaid Managed Care, Medicare Advantage, Dental, Vision, and Medicare Part D (Prescription 
Drug). Among these, Dental, Vision, and Prescription Drug cover only partial healthcare needs. Individual/Group 
Comprehensive, FEHBPs, Medicaid, and Medicare provide comprehensive medical coverage. For products with 
2




comprehensive coverage, insured populations and payers are different. Individual Comprehensive insurance is paid 
by individuals not qualified for Medicare or Medicaid. Group Comprehensive insurance is paid by employers to 
cover employees’ healthcare plans. FEHBPs are paid by the federal government to cover federal government 
employees’ medical needs. Medicare Advantage plans are paid by Medicare beneficiaries. And Medicaid managed 
care plans are financed by state and federal government to cover indigent population’s medical needs. Therefore, 
health insurers with more than one product line collect premiums from different payers and navigate different 
patients on their physician networks. Our study focuses on insurers with majority of business operations in insurance 
products with comprehensive coverage: Individual/Group Comprehensive, FEHBPs, Medicare, and Medicaid.  
 
 
LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES  
 
 The relationship between product diversification and firm performance has been studied extensively in the 
finance literature (Stultz, 1990, Graham et al., 2002, Villalonga, 2004a and 2004b, Santalo and Becerra, 2008, 
Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2010). In the insurance literature, similar studies have examined life/health and 
property/liability insurance industries (Liebenberg and Sommer, 2008, Elango, et al., 2008, Cummins, et al., 2010). 
To explain product diversification – firm performance relationship, researchers extended theories such as economies 
of scope, agency theory, and risk-reduction. But empirical studies do not provide conclusive results because of 
sample and research design limitations in different industries. To explore this important relationship for U.S. health 
insurance industry, we adapt existing theories to U.S. health insurers considering the special nature of business 
described in Section II and formulate the following hypotheses.   
 
Economies of scope dominate agency theory: product diversification is expected to improve performance of 
U.S. health insurers with major business in comprehensive products.  
 
 Health insurers with major business in comprehensive products may benefit from product diversification 
when economies of scope are realized. Teece (1980) defined economies of scope as the internalization of knowhow 
and other inputs common to two or more production processes. Berger, et al. (1999) contended that economies of 
scope can originate from cost complementarity such as sharing the input and managerial expertise. Similarly, in 
studying Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) efficiency, Given (1996) summarized economies of scope as 
‘the existence of a fixed cost or ‘quasi-public’ input that can be utilized in the production of a number of different 
outputs’. In fact, the business operation features of health insurers with major business in comprehensive products 
favor the realization of economies of scope. Besides sharable fixed cost of underwriting, claim processing, and 
administration among different products that are common to the other industries, sharable physician network 
provides health insurers a unique cost advantage as follows. First, though payers and population demographics vary, 
patients with comprehensive coverage can be taken care of on the same physician network. This saves insurers’ 
managed care contracting cost substantially. Second, managed care skills aiming at healthcare cost saving and 
quality improvement as described in Section II are applicable across product lines with comprehensive coverage. 
However, the cost advantage of physician networks will not be significant if health insurers diversify to product 
lines with partial coverage such as dental and vision insurance since new physician networks would be needed. 
Finally, diversification of products with comprehensive coverage may increase the enrollment, which improves 
insurers’ bargaining power in negotiating managed care contracts with providers. Insurers possessing more 
bargaining power get more favorable reimbursement rate to providers (Sorensen 2003 and Wu 2009). The favorable 
reimbursement rate lowers insurers’ medical costs among multiple comprehensive product lines, which results in 
better performance. Therefore, from the perspective of economies of scope, diversification of products with 
comprehensive coverage is expected to benefit health insurers.                                    
 
 On the other hand, insurers may diversify, but diversification may not benefit firm performance. The type 
of diversification, unrelated or related, may be an important factor. Agency theory has been proposed as a possible 
explanation. Aminud and Lev (1981) advanced the agency cost model and attributed firm diversification to 
managers’ risk-reduction in their non-diversifiable employment risk. Jensen (1986) and Stultz (1990) proposed that 
managers have an incentive to increase managerial perquisites in order to improve their power and compensation. 
Diversification under these managerial concerns may not be value maximizing for insurers or their investors. 
Moreover, this also may explain firms’ diversification to unrelated business, which generates even greater penalty. 
In fact, using the Business Information Tracking Series (BITS) data, Villalonga (2004a) found evidence of a 
discount penalty for unrelated diversification but a premium for related diversification. In our study, we focus on the 
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diversification among comprehensive health insurance products, which is related diversification. Even though 
payers and population demographics vary, comprehensive lines of health products share similarities. Most 
importantly, comprehensive products may share the same physician network and managed care skills. Thus, we 
expect that the agency cost generated by managerial perquisites might be minor for health insurers that diversify in 
comprehensive health products. 
 
Payer mix and insured population mix reduce health insurers’ performance volatility: product diversification 
is expected to improve risk-adjusted performance of U.S. health insurers.  
 
 Diversified firms with imperfectly correlated cash flows from different lines of business can reduce the 
overall income volatility or the firm risk (Lewellen, 1971, Cummins, et al., 2001, and Cummins and Trainer, 2009). 
Firm risk-reduction decreases the cost of financial distress and increases the debt capacity. Using data on the 
issuance of public bonds by U.S. corporations 1990 – 2007, Franco, et al. (2010) found diversified firms paid 
significantly lower bond-offering yields. Hann, et al. (2013) also found lower cost of capital for diversified firms.  
 
 This study focuses on comprehensive health coverage, which offers a variety of payers and insured 
subpopulations with different demographics. As described in Section II, each comprehensive health product line 
collects premium income from a different source (individuals, employers, federal or state government). And each 
product line covers different subpopulations that differ in age, employment status, and morbidity, which result in 
varying claim costs. Each product line is underwritten independently. The underwriting results measured by loss 
ratios or medical loss ratios are imperfectly correlated because of the payer mix and population demographics mix. 
Therefore, it is expected that the overall firm performance volatility or risk can be reduced and health insurers’ cost 
of capital is lowered accordingly. Further, the capital cost savings may boost health insurers’ performance. Thus, we 
expect that diversification of products with comprehensive health coverage may benefit health insurers’ risk-
adjusted performance.    
 
 
MODEL, VERIABLES, AND STATISTICAL METHODS 
 
 In this section, we present the model and variables to test hypotheses developed for health insurers. 
Statistical methods are also discussed.  
 
Model 
Performancei,t = α + β1 × Sizei,t + β2 × AssetRiski,t + β3 × UnderwritingRiski,t  
                              + β4 × ProdDiveri,t + δ × ControlVarsVectori,t + γ × YearDummies + εi,t 
  
The above model is the main statistical model we use in the analysis. The key research question to test is 
whether the level of diversification (ProdDiver) is significantly related to the health insurers’ performance, 
controlling for the other covariates. In the statistical model, we are going to examine whether β4 in the above model 
is statistically significant. The sign of β4 determines whether diversification results in performance premium or 
discount. If economies of scope prevail, we expect to see significant and positive β4. In the meantime, the model is 
capable of testing the impact of economies of scale by examining statistical significance of β1. Moreover, β2 and β3 
shows whether taking more asset risk and underwriting risk result in better performance as predicted by risk-return 
relationship. In addition, a vector of control variables includes predictors that are commonly used in the empirical 
literature in insurance industries such as type of organizational form and group affiliation.2 
 
 
                                               
2 Financial leverage is another control variable frequently used in firm performance literature. In the insurance industry, more capital lowers an 
insurer’s probability of financial distress (Colquitt and Hoyt, 1997). And insurers with lower financial risk are able to charge higher price for 
insurance policies with similar coverage than insurers with higher financial risk (Sommer 1996). Unlike other types of insurers, health insurers 
may experience more uncertainties on claim cost and they need more capital to avoid insolvency. We examined the leverage of health insurers 
included in our sample 2005 – 2014. The industry practice is consistent and stable. The mean leverage level is maintained at above 0.50 all 
through, which is much higher compared to the other insurer types. More interestingly, the minimum leverage level is always around 0.40, and 
the standard deviation is always below 0.2. These statistics show that leverage does not vary from firm to firm significantly for health insurers 
underwriting comprehensive coverage products. In the meantime, leverage is usually endogenous in firm performance studies, which causes 
econometric difficulties. Therefore, we decide to exclude it from the analysis. 
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 Return on asset (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) in either book or market value are commonly used 
financial performance measures in finance, banking, and insurance literature (Amit and Livant, 1988, Brown, 
Carson, and Hoyt, 2001, Lai and Limpaphayom, 2003). Recently, researchers use Risk-Adjusted ROA (RAROA) or 
ROE (RAROE) to incorporate return volatility through years (Browne, et al., 2000, Elango, et al. 2008, and Berger, 
et al. 2010). We examine the financial performance of health insurers using both return-type and risk-adjusted return 
type measures. Following the previous literature, ROA is constructed as the current year net income divided by the 
book value of total assets. Randomly high or low return in a year usually results from the risk-taking in underwriting 
and asset portfolio investment. Risk-adjusted return on asset (RAROA) is meant to compensate for this impact. 
Following Elango, et al. (2008), we calculate RAROA as the current year ROA divided by the standard deviation of 
ROA in the past three years. In addition to return on assets, we examine return on capital (ROC) and risk-adjusted 
return on capital (RAROC) instead of return on equity since majority of health insurers are not publicly traded 
companies, and so lack market equity values.  
 
Diversification Measure 
 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a commonly used measure for the level of diversification in 
industrial organization studies in economics. Researchers in finance and insurance industries also employ HHI or 
modified versions of HHI in product line mix and concentration research (Tombs and Hoyt, 1994, Sommer, 1996, 
Pottier and Sommer, 1997, and Elango, Ma, and Pope, 2008). Besides the primary HHI or modified HHI, entropy 
measure is first introduced by Jacquemin and Berry (1979) to incorporate different business segment information 
and to quantify unrelated product diversification. In our study, we use the primary HHI measure for the level of 
product diversification because we focus on insurers with majority of business in products with comprehensive 
coverage, which is under the same segment. Following Berry (1971) and Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990), we define 









Pi is the ratio of current year members covered by product i in proportion to total current year members in all 
products with comprehensive coverage. For each insurer included in the sample, there will be Individual 
Comprehensive, Group Comprehensive, FEHBPs, Medicare, and Medicaid to be included in the ProdDiver 
calculation. 3 Therefore, the minimum level of product diversification is 0, which means that the insurer focuses on 
one line of business only. And the maximum level of product diversification is 0.8, which means that the insurer 
writes all five lines of business evenly in terms of covered members. The higher value of ProdDiver means higher 
level of diversification. Table 1 shows the comprehensive product diversification trend for the entire industry 2005 – 
2014. The industry HHI was only 0.5350 in 2005 and it went up continuously to 0.7345 by 2014. The health 
insurance industry has been evolving to be more and more diversified. Based on theoretical foundation developed in 
Section III, economies of scope / scale and risk-reduction, we expect that ProdDiver is positively related to both 













                                               
3 ProdDiver = 1 – (Individual Comprehensive Members Current Year2 + Group Comprehensive Members Current Year2 + FEHBPs Members 
Current Year2 + Medicare Members Current Year2 + Medicaid Members Current Year2) / (Individual Comprehensive Members Current Year + 
Group Comprehensive Members Current Year + FEHBPs Members Current Year + Medicare Members Current Year + Medicaid Members 
Current Year)2.  
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2005 550          5,875,339          54,718,056     5,776,744      4,197,328  
   
13,024,496         83,591,963  0.5350 
2006 573          6,436,847          54,990,911     6,086,830      4,868,529  
   
14,603,305         86,986,422  0.5587 
2007 585          6,757,025          53,077,264     6,404,091      5,447,749  
   
15,255,769         86,941,898  0.5811 
2008 610          7,024,816          50,824,128     6,269,410      6,244,833  
   
16,761,757         87,124,944  0.6059 
2009 594          7,948,197          48,337,939     6,242,740      7,255,169  
   
18,908,974         88,693,019  0.6378 
2010 576          8,504,356          44,753,597     6,218,916      7,443,587  
   
20,794,618         87,715,074  0.6618 
2011 567          8,989,823          43,549,298     7,143,815      8,210,405  
   
22,728,013         90,621,354  0.6819 
2012 565          9,233,946          42,373,230     7,413,978      9,026,004  
   
25,118,384         93,165,542  0.6949 
2013 564          9,267,007          40,895,443     7,272,919      9,866,733  
   
24,759,132         92,061,234  0.7025 
2014 604        13,456,042          35,295,574     7,121,185    12,329,358  
   
33,075,917       101,278,076  0.7345 
* Industry Herfindahl is industry-based, not firm-based. It is constructed using the summation of members in each comprehensive 
line of business in the study as shown in the table. 
 
Underwriting Risk Measure 
 To measure health insurers’ underwriting risk-taking, we propose an empirical proxy: percentage of 
Medicaid members in comprehensive product portfolio. Health insurers with major business in comprehensive 
products may underwrite Individual/Group Comprehensive, FEHBPs, Medicare Advantage, and Medicaid managed 
care plans. And underwriting performance can be measured by medical loss ratio (MLR), calculated as medical 
claim cost as a percentage of premium income. High MLR may lead to financial loss. In terms of risk, the variability 
of MLR throughout time shows how well insurers may control the risk pool of each line of business. High 
variability of MLR means that insurers’ underwriting performance varies wildly or is risky. Among products with 
comprehensive coverage, different payers and population demographics expose health insurers to different MLR 
variability. In Table 2, we use two ways to examine MLR variability of each comprehensive product line 
(calculation details are explained in the table notes). Both methods show that Medicaid exposed health insurers to 
the highest MLR variability historically. Therefore, we propose to use the percentage of Medicaid members in 
health insurer’s comprehensive product lines as the underwriting risk measure. If the classical risk-return 
relationship prevails in comprehensive health insurance products, we expect a positive relationship between 
Underwriting Risk and performance measured by returns. However, when risk-taking has been taken into account 





















FEHBPs MLR Medicare MLR Medicaid MLR 
2005 0.1263 0.1796 0.2099 0.1988 
2006 0.1221 0.1465 0.1866 0.1961 
2007 0.1201 0.1345 0.1468 0.2196 
2008 0.1380 0.1807 0.1138 0.2295 
2009 0.1332 0.1766 0.1207 0.2197 
2010 0.1233 0.1431 0.1511 0.1207 
2011 0.1191 0.1420 0.1473 0.1490 
2012 0.1453 0.1466 0.1228 0.1275 
2013 0.1592 0.1516 0.1374 0.1669 
2014 0.1372 0.1478 0.1119 0.1300 
Mean 0.1324 0.1549 0.1448 0.1758 
Weighted Average of MLR Standard Deviation using Firm Members in Each Product as Weights* 
2005 - 2014  0.0415 0.0431 0.0599 0.0626 
* To validate the risk level for each line of business, we employ two methods to calculate the 
average standard deviation of MLR. Method 1 in the top panel, we calculate the standard deviation 
of MLR across the entire industry in each year. Method 2 in the bottom panel, we calculate the 
standard deviation of MLR within each firm first 2005 – 2014. Then we calculated the weighted 
average across the industry using mean memberships 2005 – 2014 as the weights. Detailed 
Calculation Method: Step 1: standard deviation of MLR of each product in each firm is taken from 
2005 - 2014; Step 2: mean members 2005 - 2014 of each product in each firm is calculated as 
weights; Step 3: weighted average of MLR of each product is calculated using weights in step 2.  
 
Asset Risk Measure 
 Health insurers manage investment portfolios to maintain timely claims reimbursement to providers and to 
generate investment income. More return is expected by taking more investment risk. Among invested asset classes, 
stock, mortgages, and real estate are identified as riskier investment (Browne, et al. 2001). Elango et al. (2008) used 
these three asset classes, as percentage of total invested assets, for property-liability insurers’ asset risk taking. 
Baranoff, et al. (2007) developed the opportunity asset risk, a volatility-based measure, to quantify life insurers’ 
asset risk-taking. Unlike other types of insurers, health insurers are in greater need of liquid assets to reimburse 
healthcare providers quickly and frequently. Moreover, the high risk level of health insurance products may generate 
unexpected liquid asset needs.4 In fact, liquidity is indeed health insurers’ major concern to maintain the 
underwriting business even though taking less asset risk may erode the investment income (Table 3). Therefore, 
liquid and high quality asset classes (cash and short-term investment, U.S. Treasuries with less than 5 years 
maturity, and high quality corporate bonds) in percentage of total invested asset represents safe asset investment and 
the rest is used as asset risk proxy in our study. Table 3 gives an overview of asset holdings on liquid and high 
quality asset classes by U.S. health insurers historically. The data shows that U.S. health insurers with major 
business in comprehensive products always held at least 50% of liquid and high quality assets on average. During 
the financial crisis years 2008 – 2009, health insurers took the lowest asset risk at below 40%. Similar to the product 
risk-taking, health insurers may expect more investment returns by taking more asset risk. If the classical risk-return 
relationship holds, we expect positive relationship between Asset Risk and performance measured by returns. 
However, when risk-taking has been taken into account for performance measured by risk-adjusted return, the 
positive relationship is not expected any more. 
                                               
4 Baranoff, et al. (2007) extended Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to rank risk level of life insurers’ products. And health insurance carries 
the highest product risk.  
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Table 3 U.S. Health Insurance Industry Investment on Liquid Asset Classes 2005 - 2014 in Millions 
Year N 
U.S. Treasury 



















2005 550  $     6,491.54   $    7,424.82   $  25,956.28   $   16,817.42   $    96,308.82  58.86% 41.14% 
2006 573  $     6,290.33   $    7,711.19   $  29,852.71   $   20,138.41   $  110,484.70  57.92% 42.08% 
2007 585  $     9,258.60   $    7,038.11   $  33,032.46   $   22,010.64   $  119,586.22  59.66% 40.34% 
2008 610  $   10,182.41   $    7,362.88   $  31,915.46   $   21,339.21   $  114,207.24  61.99% 38.01% 
2009 594  $     8,234.14   $    9,025.93   $  38,478.85   $   23,167.16   $  122,978.27  64.16% 35.84% 
2010 576  $     8,916.74   $    9,453.56   $  41,180.93   $   22,600.52   $  135,806.09  60.49% 39.51% 
2011 567  $   10,569.83   $    9,525.63   $  42,752.56   $   24,190.35   $  146,173.72  59.54% 40.46% 
2012 565  $     7,772.36   $    7,891.02   $  45,052.12   $   25,623.75   $  155,042.98  55.69% 44.31% 
2013 564  $     8,584.01   $    8,343.07   $  45,978.41   $   23,025.26   $  161,975.56  53.05% 46.95% 
2014 604  $     6,158.28   $    8,716.34   $  50,024.07   $   25,905.53   $  165,104.73  55.00% 45.00% 
* NAIC designate class 1 - 6 to invested corporate bonds according to asset quality. Class 1 is the highest quality, 
Class 2 is the high quality, Class 3-6 are medium, low, lower, and near default. High Quality Corporate Bonds are the 
summation of Class 1 and Class 2 corporate bonds. 
       
Firm Size 
 Firm size is commonly used as the proxy for economies of scale in previous diversification-performance 
literature. In studying scope economies in the US insurance industry, Cummins, et al. (2010) differentiated scale 
versus scope economics and used logarithm of total assets to measure firm size. Liebenberg and Sommer (2008) also 
used natural logarithm of total assets and found positive relationship between the firm size and the performance in 
US property-liability insurance industry. In our study, we use the geometric mean of total assets, total liabilities, and 
total premium incomes as the proxy for the firm size. Economies of scale benefit health insurers without increasing 
firm risks. Therefore, we expect positive relationship between firm size and all performance measures. 
 
Organizational Form 
 Stock and mutual are two major organizational forms for health insurers. In theory, stock insurers are faced 
with the agency cost resulting from the separation of ownership and management (Fama and Jensen, 1983 and 
Mayers and Smith, 1988). Since policyholders are the owners of the company, mutual insurers are supposed to result 
in less agency issues. However, the finding that stock insurers are more successful than mutual insurers in 
minimizing cost in Cummins, et al. (1999) suggests the existence of agency cost in mutual insurers. Liebenberg and 
Sommer (2008) also identified better performance for stock insurers in property-liability insurance industry. In our 
study, we include a dummy variable N-Type as the control of the organizational form, where a stock insurer has the 
value of 1 and a mutual insurer has the value of 0. And the impact of the agency cost on health insurers in different 
organizational forms is uncertain.  
 
Group Affiliation 
 More than 70% of health insurers in our sample are group affiliated. Cummins and Sommer (1996) argued 
that group affiliation increased the risk of failure for a group member. They treated the insurance group as a 
portfolio of options, which is worth more to shareholders than policyholders. Therefore, policyholders would rather 
pay more for policies underwritten by an insurer without group affiliation. Both Liebenberg and Sommer (2008) and 
Elango, et al. (2008) found negative relationship between the firm performance and the group affiliation for US 
property-liability insurers. However, considering health insurers’ business nature, the impact of group affiliation on 
firm performance is uncertain because of the following reasons. First, affiliated health insurers may enjoy broader 
physician networks, which gives insurers better access to providers and enable them to channel patients more 
efficiently. Second, affiliated insurers might process stronger bargaining power in negotiating managed care 
8




contracts to get favorable reimbursement terms. In the model, insurers with group affiliation have 1 in the control 
variable N-Group and 0 otherwise. 
 
 Table 4 presents a summary of all dependent and independent variables used in the analysis. And Table 5 
summarizes expected relationships between independent variables and performance measures.  
 









ROA Net income / total assets 
RAROA ROA / Three-year standard deviation of ROA including the current year 
ROC Net income / Book capital 










Size log(Total assets*Total premiums*Total liabilities)/3 
Asset Risk 
1 - Sum (U.S. Treasury with Less Than 5 Yrs Maturity, High Quality Corporate 
Bonds, Cash and Short-Term Investment)/Total Invested Assets 
Underwriting 
Risk 
Medicaid Members / Total Comprehensive Coverage Members 
Prod Diver 
Modified Herfindahl index of Individual Comprehensive, Group Comprehensive, 
FEHBPs, Medicare, and Medicaid using Members 
N-Type Organizational type (1 = Stock) 
N-Group Group affiliation (1 = Yes) 
 
Table 5 Expected Relationships of Independent and Dependent Variables 
  Size Asset Risk 
Underwriting 
Risk 
Prod Diver N-Type N-Group 
Return + + + + +/- +/- 
Risk-Adjusted Return + +/- +/- + +/- +/- 
 
The study uses health insurers’ financial statements annual filings data to National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC). And we focus on insurers with more than 90% of business income generated from 
comprehensive coverage products. From 2005 to 2014, there are 5,788 firm-years included in the study. Here is the 
summary statistics for all variables in selected years: 
 
Table 6 Summary Statistics of Variables in Every Three Years 
Variables 
2005 2008 2011 2014 
Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev 
ROA 0.0709 0.1546 0.0280 0.1764 0.0608 0.1330 -0.0220 0.1704 
RAROA 1.6199 2.8967 1.0922 3.4009 1.2853 2.2791 0.6270 2.8698 
ROC 0.1192 0.3827 0.0586 0.4285 0.1078 0.3608 -0.0922 0.4786 
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RAROC 1.6148 3.0627 1.3952 3.7911 1.4481 2.7479 0.6600 3.1746 
Size 17.6867 1.9934 17.8160 1.9663 18.2046 1.9289 18.4275 1.8591 
Asset Risk 0.1424 0.4250 0.0471 0.4882 0.1188 0.4476 0.1753 0.4318 
Underwriting 
Risk 0.1976 0.3689 0.1895 0.3532 0.2363 0.3833 0.2506 0.3954 
Prod Diver 0.1742 0.2145 0.2201 0.2231 0.2228 0.2294 0.2401 0.2396 
  N = 550 N = 610 N = 567 N = 604 
N-Type 397 450 422 424 




 For the 5,788 firm-years in 2005 – 2014 in the analysis, we ran the fixed effect model for the unbalanced 
panel data. Year dummies are included in all models. As reported in the finance literature, firms’ diversification 
decision is possibly self-selected (Campa and Kedia, 2002 and Villalonga, 2004b). To control for this possible 
endogeneity issue, we use the lag of the diversification measure (LagProdDiver) in the statistical model. And we run 
the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity to make sure that the endogeneity issue is resolved after the 
adjustment.5   
 
 For the main model, both performance measures (return and risk-adjusted return) are used as alternative 
dependent variables. The purpose is to test whether product diversification benefits risk-adjusted return after 
controlling for asset and product risk-taking. Besides, using return on capital and risk-adjusted return on capital 
instead of return on asset provides robust check of model results. More importantly, we separate the entire sample 
into two time periods: the financial crisis period (2005 – 2009) and the ACA reform period (2010 – 2014). The goal 
is to check whether impact of product diversification on firm performance still exists and whether the impact exists 





 In this section, we present statistical analysis results on the relationship between comprehensive product 
diversification and health insurers’ performance measured by ROA, RAROA, ROC, and RAROC. The major result 
in Table 7 covers 2005 – 2014, the entire study period. The sub-period of 2005 – 2009 studies this relationship 
during financial crisis (Table 8). And the sub-period of 2010 – 2014 shows the relationship in the healthcare reform 
era (Table 9). Results are consistent with our expectations. First, the comprehensive product diversification is 
positively related to health insurers’ performance in all time-frame controlling for insurers’ risk-taking on asset 
investment and underwriting, firm size, and other control variables. These results are robust using all performance 
measures. Second, for asset risk and underwriting risk, the positive relationships only hold for performance 
measured by returns. When performance risk is taken into account, the positive contribution from product risk and 
asset risk is gone. These observations validate that the risk-return relationship holds for health insurers and the 
proxies we propose to measure underwriting and asset risk-taking are effective. More importantly, it supports that 
product diversification is positively related to insurers’ performance without adding the risk-taking. Finally, another 
insightful result is that the positive relationship of product diversification – performance relationship is slightly 
stronger during financial crisis period than healthcare reform period. During financial crisis years, product 
diversification might balance the negative impact of the financial market turmoil for health insurers. However, when 
the healthcare reform is affecting almost all comprehensive product lines, the positive diversification-performance 





                                               
5 Wooldridge, J. M., 2002, Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, The MIT Press, Page 118 
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Major Results: health insurers with major business in comprehensive products 2005 – 2014 
Table 7 Fixed-Effect Panel Regression Analysis Results 2005 - 2014 
Variables 
ROA RAROA ROC RAROC 
Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value 
Intercept -0.2182 <.0001 -5.5422 <.0001 -0.5991 <.0001 -4.6568 <.0001 
Size 0.0166 <.0001 0.4150 <.0001 0.0438 <.0001 0.3969 <.0001 
Asset Risk 0.0099 0.0509 0.0861 0.4763 0.0269 0.0413 0.2219 0.0659 
Underwriting Risk 0.0167 0.0031 -0.0519 0.6995 0.0372 0.0112 0.0540 0.6876 
LagProd Diver 0.0362 0.0006 0.5102 0.0416 0.0864 0.0015 1.0000 <.0001 
N-Type 0.0366 <.0001 0.4151 0.0003 0.1033 <.0001 0.5895 <.0001 
N-Group 0.0153 0.0019 0.1591 0.1770 -0.0305 0.0176 -0.1061 0.3670 
  N=5,144 N=5,142 N=5,144 N=5,142 
  Adj. R
2=0.0900 Adj. R2=0.0602 Adj. R2=0.0760 Adj. R2=0.0618 
 
 
 The main results in Table 7 confirm most of our expectations on relationships of predetermined variables 
with U.S. health insurers’ performance. First, the coefficient of Lag Prod Diver is positive and significant at 1% 
level in three of the performance measures. Health insurers with higher level of comprehensive product 
diversification experienced better performance measured by ROA and ROC. More importantly, the positive impact 
is even stronger for risk-adjusted returns, RAROA and RAROC, which supports theoretical foundation of 
economies of scope and/or risk-reduction. Second, coefficient of size is always highly significant at 1% and positive 
using all performance measures. Economies of scale work perfectly for health insurers. Third, for the two risk-taking 
measures we introduce, asset risk and underwriting risk, their relationships with firm performance are also as 
expected. For underwriting risk, we use the proportion of Medicaid members in total comprehensive members as the 
empirical proxy. More underwriting risk-taking is positively related to higher firm performance and the relationship 
is highly significant. As to asset risk, we use the proportion of asset classes with less liquidity and lower quality in 
investment portfolios as the proxy. The higher investment performance is expected for higher asset risk-taking 
considering experience in the other insurance industries. Results show that more asset risk-taking was not improving 
firm performance so significantly using all performance measures. Though the equation using ROA as the 
dependent variable produces significant coefficient for Asset Risk at 10%, the magnitude is marginal at 0.0099. 
However, the result again confirms that liquidity, instead of generating investment income, should be health 
insurers’ major concern. Other important observations regarding Underwriting Risk and Asset Risk are the 
insignificant coefficients when performance variability is controlled using RAROA and RAROC. On the one hand, 
results confirm that the better performance in ROA and ROC equations is generated from more risk-taking. On the 
other hand, results on Underwriting Risk and Asset Risk highlight the positive impact of product diversification on 
firm performance from the perspective of economies of scope and risk-reduction instead of risk-taking. Finally, 
results on control variables are similar to findings in the other insurance sectors. Stock insurers (N-Type = 1) 
performed better. As to group affiliation (N-Group = 1), result using ROC as the dependent variable is consistent 
with findings in the other insurance industries.          
 
The Financial Crisis Period 2005 – 2009 
Table 8 Fixed-Effect Panel Regression Analysis Results 2005 – 2009 
Variables 
ROA RAROA ROC RAROC 
Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value 
Intercept -0.2023 <.0001 -6.0480 <.0001 -0.5324 <.0001 -3.7077 0.0002 
Size 0.0163 <.0001 0.4434 <.0001 0.0427 <.0001 0.3622 <.0001 
Asset Risk 0.0003 0.9682 0.0704 0.7018 0.0021 0.9082 0.2062 0.1919 
Underwriting Risk 0.0108 0.2040 -0.1787 0.4059 0.0292 0.1723 0.0645 0.7271 
LagProd Diver 0.0434 0.0058 0.3690 0.3513 0.1220 0.0020 1.0793 0.0015 
N-Type 0.0207 0.0034 0.0461 0.7961 0.0574 0.0012 0.2439 0.1111 
N-Group 0.0146 0.0369 0.2126 0.2285 -0.0409 0.0200 -0.1397 0.3571 
  N=2,563 N=2,562 N=2,563 N=2,562 
  Adj. R
2=0.0678 Adj. R2=0.0543 Adj. R2=0.0601 Adj. R2=0.0618 
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 During the financial crisis years, taking more asset risk or product risk no longer brought higher returns or 
risk-adjusted returns for health insurers. Coefficients of Asset Risk and Underwriting Risk are not significant any 
more. However, product diversification helped health insurers weather the financial turmoil. The coefficient of Lag 
Prod Diver at 0.0434 is greater than the whole period result of 0.0362 and highly significant in the ROA equation. 
Greater coefficients are also observed in ROC and RAROC equations. For the other control variables, economies of 
scale still work for large insurers in securing better performance.   
 
The Healthcare Reform Period 2010 – 2014 
 The Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 revamps the entire healthcare industry. Major provisions of ACA 
affect almost all comprehensive health insurance products. Under these substantial changes in the healthcare market, 
diversification does not work as effectively as before. In ROA equation, the coefficient of Lag Prod Diver at 0.0311 
is lower than results during financial crisis years and significant at 5% level. Risk-takings in asset and product again 
relate positively to performance after the turmoil of the financial crisis. Coefficients of the other control variables 
did not change significantly.       
 
Table 9 Fixed-Effect Panel Regression Analysis Results 2010 – 2014 
Variables 
ROA RAROA ROC RAROC 
Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value 
Intercept -0.2590 <.0001 -5.3575 <.0001 -0.7114 <.0001 -5.8331 <.0001 
Size 0.0164 <.0001 0.3771 <.0001 0.0431 <.0001 0.4228 <.0001 
Asset Risk 0.0209 0.0030 0.2606 0.0950 0.0587 0.0019 0.2405 0.1893 
Underwriting Risk 0.0221 0.0030 0.0820 0.6202 0.0444 0.0270 0.0443 0.8197 
LagProd Diver 0.0311 0.0265 0.6772 0.0297 0.0578 0.1256 0.9675 0.0082 
N-Type 0.0527 <.0001 0.8068 <.0001 0.1493 <.0001 0.9312 <.0001 
N-Group 0.0152 0.0288 0.0793 0.6083 -0.0210 0.2628 -0.0820 0.6515 
  N=2,581 N=2,580 N=2,581 N=2,580 
  Adj. R




 U.S. health insurers have been challenged since the financial crisis of 2008 – 2009. Following the financial 
crisis, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) took effect in 2010 and has been restructuring the whole industry ever since. 
Major provisions of the ACA such as health insurance mandate, Medicaid expansion, health insurance exchanges, 
and small business group insurance requirement affect most of health insurers’ comprehensive product lines. At this 
critical moment, our study presents a picture on historical and ongoing relationships between product diversification 
and firm performance for this industry.  
 
 In theory, economies of scope, risk-reduction, and agency theory were developed to explain the 
diversification-performance relationship in finance, economics and insurance. We adapt these theories to the unique 
business operations of U.S. health insurers. Theories predict that product diversification in comprehensive lines of 
business is positively related to health insurers’ performance even when performance risk is controlled.  
 
 To facilitate the empirical study, we employ the commonly used measure for the level of product 
diversification, modified Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). Moreover, we develop new measures for health 
insurers’ risk-taking in underwriting and asset investment taking account of the nature of health insurers’ business. 
The proportion of asset classes with low liquidity and low quality in investment portfolios is used to proxy the asset 
risk because health insurers need high liquidity and quality of their assets to reimburse healthcare providers 
promptly. The proportion of Medicaid managed care members in health insurers’ product portfolio is treated as the 
underwriting risk since Medicaid MLR experienced highest volatility throughout the years.  
 
 Using health insurers’ annual financial statements filings data to NAIC, we find that product diversification 
among Individual/Group Comprehensive insurance, Federal Employee Health Benefit Plans, Medicare Advantage 
plans, and Medicaid managed care plans is positively related to health insurers’ performance 2005 – 2014. And the 
positive relationship holds when performance volatility is controlled. This finding is consistent with other insurance 
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sectors. And it is illuminating to health insurers because results show that product diversification improved insurers’ 
performance without adding risk. An interesting observation is that the positive relationship is not so strong when 
each line of business in the product portfolio is affected by ACA provisions in the reform years. In fact, this finding 
supports the theoretical foundation of risk reduction: when the systematic risk increases, each product in the 
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